EGYPT REVOLUTION
A week ago, Egypt’s revolution commemorated the second anniversary
of its beginning. It hasn’t, however, been a week of celebrations – the
day itself was considered by many Egyptian activists and political
forces to be a reminder that after two years of transition, the
revolution has not delivered on its potential. Moreover, violence has
occupied the attention of the media, with civil unrest rocking cities
such as Port Said, Suez and the centre of Cairo.
These are not disparate occurrences – they are inextricably linked.
Two years ago, Egyptians did not rise up against a man – Hosni Mubarak –
but against a system. The famous call during those 18 days of protests
was clear: “the people want the fall of the regime.” In the two years
since, however, that regime not only remains more or less intact – but
the system within, which it operated, has taken a turn for the worse.
Those who claim to support Egypt’s revolution have a lot more to do
before it can be considered to have been completed.
While the regime within the institutions of the state has largely
survived intact – despite many efforts of President Mohammed Morse to
impose his own hegemonic regime – the institutions of the state have
been weakened.
So, while the state and its institutions are not coming apart, cracks
have formed – cracks that have been building not for days or nor weeks,
but for many months. What we have seen over the past few days is the
exploitation of those cracks as they are subjected to pressure through
this crisis.
Since the beginning of this revolution, calls for reforming the
institutions of the state have gone largely unheeded. Instead, the
institutions have continued to deteriorate. During the transition, they
have not been given the proper attention required to see them strengthen
and function in a more just manner.
The ministry of interior, which governs the infamous Egyptian security services, for example, has certainly not been reformed and, as a result, is unable to carry out its responsibilities effectively. The violence over the last few days, which has cost the lives more than 60 Egyptians, is directly related to this continuing deterioration – and we should expect to see more cracks in the institution in the weeks and months ahead.
The responsibility for that deterioration can only lie with those who
have been managing the Egyptian transition since Mr. Mubarak’s
resignation – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the
presidency of Muslim Brotherhood member Mr. Morsi. It is their
responsibility to reform and alter the institutions of the state to
serve the Egyptian people more effectively, as well as fulfil the aims
of the revolution. These two forces were the only ones who had the power
to enact change. However, the SCAF did not take such steps, preferring
to focus on other issues. When Mr. Morsi took office, changing the
institutions was generally ignored in favour of steps that sought to
impose a new hegemony sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Some supporters of the government point the finger of blame towards
the opposition forces for the violence and the crisis – but the
opposition has no competency or power to affect the institutions, and it
is not responsible for the violence. To assume otherwise is to grant
the opposition more clout than it actually possesses. If the opposition
and the government were to stand together and urge an end to the
violence sreets, it would be largely ignored.
The grievances being heard on the streets of Egypt’s cities are not
political in any case – they are far more raw than that, and the
violence will only continue if the core causes of those grievances are
not addressed. The institutions of the state are not equipped to deal
with the outbreak of a crisis when things break down. Egyptians will
urgently need these institutions in the period ahead, most particularly
because the worsening economic situation is colliding with popular
discontent over Mr. Morsi’s government.
The last few days are an indictment of the opposition political
leadership for many things – but not because of the outbreak of violence
or the inability of the state to suitably manage that violence. Only
the governing powers of the past two years can be held to account in
that regard – the reforming and restructuring of the institutions of the
state should have been the first priorities of any post-Mubarak regime.
They were not – and they should be held to account for that. It is unclear, however, whether they will be held to account; not unless the leadership of the opposition is able to organize effectively, in political terms, to ensure that.”
As such, it is likely that the state’s institutions will deteriorate further, until either a stronger political opposition can hold the government to account – or until a new president is elected into office. Neither appears likely for some time.
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